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The economic slowdown and the active politi-
cal season are generating calls for imposing new
regulations on executive pay. Thepresidential can-
didates of the twomajor parties have lashedout at
what they perceive to be excessive pay for certain
executives or for corporate executives in general.
Such populist sentiments are often based on
misunderstandings about the role of corporate
executives in the economy and the vigorous com-
petition that exists for these highly skilled lead-
ers. In the past, federal regulatory efforts based
on such misunderstandings have generated
unintended consequences, which have damaged
the economy and hurt the ability of the market
for executives to self-regulate over time.
The labor market for executives and the asso-
ciated pay levels are already subject to high levels
of regulation. Indeed, U.S. corporations are sub-
ject to more stringent executive pay disclosure
requirements than corporations anywhere else in
the world. Before additional regulatory and leg-
islative efforts are unleashed, policymakers
should examine the rationale for current pay
structures and the strong links between executive
pay and corporate performance.
Themisperceptions that drive regulatory efforts
are grounded in the idea that themarket for execu-
tives is not competitive and that pay levels do not
reflect supply and demand for talent. Critics claim
thatexecutivesessentially set theirownpaythrough
their influence over the boards of directors of cor-
porations. This “myth of managerial power” leads
some policymakers to conclude that greater gov-
ernment regulation isnecessarybecause themarket
is “rigged.” However, a large body of empirical
research documents that labor markets for execu-
tives are indeed competitive, and that pay levels
track corporate performance.
This study examines themarket forces that set
the parameters of executive compensation, the
process that boards use to determine pay pack-
ages, and the data that indicate the efficient work-
ings of the current “pay-for-performance” model.
It also discusses the adverse consequences of
imposing rules and regulations on an executive
compensation system that has helped to generate
great wealth for shareholders andmillions of jobs
for American workers.
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Overview of the Issues
The executive paymodel widely used in the
United States is essential to the success of U.S.
corporations and continued growth in the
economy. But this “pay-for-performance”
model is now threatened by overregulation,
which is driven by misperceptions about the
labormarket for executive talent.That isunfor-
tunate, because the competitive systemof exec-
utive pay has helped fuel business growth,
which has generated wealth for shareholders
and opportunities for corporate employees.
Attempts to control the labor market for exec-
utives and reshape the pay levels it produces
may undermine this successful system.
The success of the U.S. economy is closely
connected to its unique approach to human
capital. This approach is based on relatively
unregulated labor markets, high labor mobili-
ty, and a century-long reliance on various
forms of incentive pay. In general, labor mar-
kets in the United States are among the least
regulated in the world.1 Job candidates enter
themarket and competewith other candidates
for the highest wages, while employers pay the
wages required to recruit and retain talent and
motivate performance. Supply and demand
generally set the parameters for pay, without
the government restricting howmuch employ-
ees can earn for the value they create.
The U.S. labor market for corporate execu-
tives is an important exception to the general
U.S. policy of minimizing labor market regu-
lation. Critics have argued that the labor mar-
ket for executives does not reflect supply and
demand for executive talent, and that execu-
tives essentially set their own pay through
power over their boards of directors. Compli-
ant human resources executives, compensa-
tion consultants, and boardmembers bend to
the will of the chief executive officer (CEO) in
shaping executive pay packages. We refer to
this view as the “myth of managerial power.”2
Productive discussions about the best
methods of setting executive pay have been
partly preempted by faulty assumptions
about executive pay promoted in the popular
press and the business media. Media stories
often portray a corporate America ruled by
executive greed and excess.
Nevertheless, meaningful debates about
executive compensation are taking place. In a
recent Watson Wyatt survey of board mem-
bers of major corporations and institutional
investors, we found that board members
believe that the pay-for-performance model
directly contributes to improved corporate
performance.3 By contrast, many institutional
investors tend to view executive pay as exces-
sive.Given thesedifferences inhowboards and
investors assess executive pay, the two groups
need towork together to continue refiningpay
structures. The important point is that execu-
tive pay structures evolve over time and are
subject to ongoing reforms within a competi-
tive market environment.
ADynamic and Competitive Market
The parameters for executive pay are deter-
mined by supply and demand, and incentive
payouts for executives are generally deter-
mined by performance. In the market for top
corporate executives, companies search for
and hire CEOs from an extremely small pool
of people. Those people must be capable of
managing large and complex organizations
and be willing to risk a large portion of their
pay on their ability to increase company value.
Many executives are paid handsomely, but
their pay reflects only a small share of the tril-
lions of dollars of wealth they help to create
for shareholders.
The labor market for CEOs is very com-
petitive. They are hired and fired, and their
pay goes up and down, commensurate with
the performance of their companies. That
conclusion is based on our own research and
the results of many academic studies.4 But
this reality of the competitive pay environ-
ment of America’s executives is at odds with
the myth of managerial power.
Many examples show how executive pay-
for-performance works, but let’s look first at
stock options. Although stock options have
become less popular recently, they remain the
archetypal executive pay program and are still
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granted to thousands ofCEOs. Table 1 reports
our analysis of the relationship between the
total return to shareholders generated by com-
panies and the related stock option compensa-
tion for executives.5 A review of the largest
1,088 companies in the United States in 2006
shows that the higher-performing companies
provided larger stock option profits to execu-
tives and the largest increase in stock option
profits over the prior year. Thus, executives in
companies that performed well were rewarded
for that better performance.
As withmost markets, outliers exist in the
executive pay market. At some companies,
the executive does not demonstrate excep-
tional performance and still receives substan-
tial pay. Such outliers are often challenged by
shareholders and called out in the press. But
the market usually corrects itself, and such
executives are commonly ousted for poor
performance. The outliers push the bound-
aries of the system, but they spur self-regula-
tion and reform.
Most economists and executive pay
experts believe that the labormarket for exec-
utive talent functions well. Supply and
demand primarily determine the amount of
compensation that executives receive, while
other institutional factors, such as manageri-
al power and the structure of corporate
boards, play a minor and secondary role.
Here is some of the evidence that the U.S.
market for corporate executives is competi-
tive and efficient:
• Executives alwayshave theoption toquit,
andmanydo.Oneof theprimary respon-
sibilities of corporate boards is to ensure
continuity ofmanagement. Boards know
that if executives are underpaid, they can
leave and gain higher pay elsewhere. The
cost of a highly skilled executive quitting
can be billions of dollars in market capi-
talization.
• NewlyhiredCEOs fromoutside areoften
paid much more than internal promo-
tions. The managerial power argument
cannot explain that differential.
• High-performing companies reward
executives with higher “realizable” pay
than low-performing companies, as we
examine below.
• Market pressures work. In recent years,
boards and executives have responded to
market pressures by putting in more per-
formance-based pay programs and reduc-
ing or eliminating non-performance-
based programs, specifically severance,
perquisites, and executive supplemental
pensions.6
• Prior attempts to reducepay through leg-
islation and regulation have probably
resulted inhigher, not lower, pay for exec-
utives. Examples include the limits on
golden parachutes, the $1million cap on
the tax deductibility of certain corporate
pay, and enhanced proxy disclosure.
These rules have generally not reduced
pay but forced corporate boards to adopt
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Table 1
Company Returns and Profits on Stock Options
Companies Executive Profits on Stock Options
Number of One-Year 2005 2006 Change (%),
Companies Return (%), 2006 $millions $millions 2005–2006
Companies Creating High Returns 544 28 6.6 10.8 63
Companies Creating Low Returns 544 -3 8.8 5.5 -38
All Companies 1,088 12 7.9 7.6 -4
Source: Watson Wyatt Worldwide data.
Notes: All numbers and percentages are medians, except for the number of companies. Returns refer to total share-
holder returns (stock price appreciation plus dividends).
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different and often less effective types of
compensation.
• Peer group pay data are used appropri-
ately by corporate boards. Critics believe
that corporate management cherry-
picks data to support large pay increas-
es, but academic studies do not support
that contention.7
We document and discuss these points fur-
ther throughout this report.
Goals of Executive
Compensation
Corporate boards design executive pay pro-
grams to attract, retain, and motivate execu-
tives to perform at high levels. Motivation
plays an important role in companies’ ability
to achieve high returns and to encourage exec-
utives to make decisions that increase share-
holder value. Incentive pay programs are par-
ticularly effective motivators, especially at the
top level of businesses. The small cost savings
that would occur from reductions in incen-
tive-based executive compensationwould like-
ly be far outweighed by the resulting declines
inproductivity, profitability, and stockmarket
returns.
For executives, base pay provides a stable
source of income set at competitive levels,
while other fixed pay and benefits are useful
for attractingand retaining talent.Annual and
long-term pay incentives motivate perfor-
mance that contributes to the creation of
long-term value. Pensions, supplemental exec-
utive retirement plans, and deferred compen-
sation plans promote retention and company
affiliation. Severance plans allow executives to
take the risks necessary to maximize share-
holder value even if that means jeopardizing
their own jobs.
Executive pay programs must also align
with broader employee pay programs so that
efforts are synchronized throughout the
organization. In addition, executive pay pro-
grams must send effective signals to stake-
holders—especially shareholders—about the
company’s strategic imperatives. And finally,
pay programs must meet specific business
needs within specific environments. If a com-
pany is suffering fromdeclining revenues, for
example, the pay program should reward
executives for not only profitability but also
for revenue growth. At the same time, for
growing companies pay packages should
focus on profitability and returns in excess of
the cost of capital employed.
Competitive Pay Needed to Control
Turnover
Any employer who underpays an employee
relative to themarket risks losing that employ-
ee and the value he or she brings to the compa-
ny. Boards try to ensure continuity ofmanage-
ment, but they face a constant threat of losing
a CEO if more lucrative opportunities arise.
This is the primary consideration of corporate
boards’ compensation committees when they
set executive pay. The turnover rate forCEOs is
very high and acts as a constant reminder to
boards that CEOs can leave their jobs. In 2007
CEOs changed at 57 of the Standard & Poor’s
500 companies.8 Between 1995 and 2006
annual CEO turnover increased 59 percent,
according to a survey of the world’s 2,500
largest publicly traded corporations.9 In the
United States, almost half of the largest corpo-
rationswill have to replace their CEOs over the
next four years, according to aHarvard Business
Review study.10
Many of these departing CEOs are poached
by other companies. In 2005, for example,
Office Depot took Steve Odland from Auto-
zone, and Hewlett-Packard took Mark Hurd
from NCR. The number two and three execu-
tives atMotorola,NCR, Bellsouth, andGeneral
Electric were recruited in the early 2000s to
becomeCEOsatTyco,HewlettPackard,Sprint,
3M, andHomeDepot, respectively.
The recruiting packages offered are often
large, partly because successful executives
usually have unvested restricted stock and
stock options for which they need to be com-
pensated when they move. In addition, com-
panies need to offer executives upside oppor-
tunities when they come on board. However,
4
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compensation committees have not “lost
control” of the pay process, as critics claim,
they are simply buyers of talent in a tight
labor market.
The cost of a high-performing CEO quit-
ting can be billions of dollars in market capi-
talization. Imaginewhat itmight costApple to
lose Steve Jobs. Among North American cor-
porations, announcing the departure of a
CEO with a two-year record of strong perfor-
mance pulls the company’s stock price down
by an average of 10.2 percentage points com-
paredwith thebroadmarket averageover a30-
day period, according to a 2007 Booz Allen
Hamilton study.11
Similarly, a 2003 study of 872 CEO depar-
tures by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York found that equity volatility increases
following CEO turnover, even when the CEO
leaves voluntarily and is replaced by someone
from inside the firm.12 These market reac-
tions are measures of the contributions of
CEOs to the success of companies.
Although CEOs have a substantial impact
on corporate performance, CEO pay is a very
small part of the overall cost structure of
companies. Table 2 compares total CEO pay
to total sales, market capitalization, and net
income for a sample of 1,398 U.S. corpora-
tions. Total CEO pay in 2004 was just 0.09
percent of sales, 0.06 percent of market capi-
talization, and 1.3 percent of net income for
the companies.
These findings are consistent with a study
by Brian Hall and Jeffrey Liebman, who
found that dramatic increases inCEOpay are
not very large relative to the market values of
firms.13 Corporate compensation commit-
tees, for good reason, are not willing to risk
continuity and performance in an attempt to
save relatively small sums of money.
Boards also understand that the loss of key
executives threatens a large portion of corpo-
rate assets in the form of disrupted strategy,
hostile takeovers, loss of revenue, and other
costs. The risks and costs of losing executives
are clear to compensation committees, which
have continued to provide high and often ris-
ing executive pay despite outbursts of public
disapproval, negative media attention, and
criticism of boardmembers.
Low Supply, High Demand
High executive compensation is a market
outcome caused by limited supply and high
and rising demand for top talent. Consider
the supply of executive talent. The number of
individuals who have the ability and willing-
ness to make the tough decisions necessary
to run large companies is very small. A CEO
must make complex business decisions such
as pursuing capital investments that earn
high returns and divesting underperforming
units, even if thatmeans downsizing an orga-
nization that the executive helped to build.
Across all U.S. labormarketswhere skill and
experience are valued, demographic trends are
creating a large number of retirements without
a sufficient supply of replacements. The medi-
anageofU.S.CEOs is56, andtheaverageageof
CEOretirement is 61.14 Fewer candidates in the
lower age groups are moving into the labor
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Table 2
CEO Pay and Corporate Costs, 2004
CEO Pay as a Share of
CEO Pay Sales Market Cap Net Income Sales Market Cap Net Income
$6.9 billion $8.1 trillion $12.0 trillion $552 billion 0.09% 0.06% 1.3%
Source: Watson Wyatt Worldwide data.
Notes: The sample is 1,398 U.S. corporations. CEO Pay includes salary plus bonus plus stock options exercised plus
long-term incentive payouts. Market Cap means market capitalization.
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market for executive talent. At the same time,
hedge funds and venture capital funds are
increasingly sucking top talent out of the cor-
porateworldbecauseof thehugesumstheycan
pay. John Joyce of IBM, Vivek Paul of Wipro,
andRichardBressler ofViacomare examples of
highly successful executives who left the corpo-
rate world to work for private equity firms.15
In addition, as the risks and responsibilities
of leading major public corporations grow,
top executives can be recruited away by private
companies, which can pay executives more
withouthaving to face intensive scrutiny. Also,
the opening up of financial markets since the
early 1980s has givenU.S. CEOs greater access
to capital for financing their own start-up
businesses, which has raised the value of alter-
native entrepreneurial opportunities.
The long-term supply of potential corpo-
rate executives is also decreasing because tal-
entedpeople graduatingwithamaster’s degree
in business administration (MBA) are entering
more lucrative professions, such as investment
banking, venture capital, and management
consulting.While corporate boards increasing-
ly want CEOs with MBA degrees, many of the
best MBAs are moving into consulting and
financial firms where the rewards can be high-
er and the risks lower. Among the 914Harvard
MBAs graduating in the class of 2007, 22 per-
cent accepted consulting jobs; 20 percent
moved into private equity, hedge funds, and
venture capital firms; and 18 percent left the
United States to work abroad.16
Although finding talented executives has
become more difficult, corporate boards have
faced growing pressure to terminate CEOs
who performpoorly. CEOs are being fired at a
high and rising rate. In 1995, one in eight
departing CEOs was forced from office; in
2006, nearly one in three left involuntarily.17
Proponents of the managerial power the-
ory claim that the “entrenchment” of CEOs
and boards often leads to the failure to dis-
miss poorly performing CEOs. The reality is
probably the opposite. There is a growing
risk that boards are becoming too aggressive
at dismissing executives. The pressure for
accountability to shareholders has raised the
possibility that shareholders may agitate for
CEO dismissal in response to short-run per-
formance changes, even when those changes
are beyond the CEO’s control.18
At thesametimethat thesupplyofexecutive
talent is shrinking, the demand for highly per-
forming executives is increasing. One reason is
that corporate boards are now looking for dif-
ferent skills inhiringexecutives than theydid in
the past, and the number of executives who
possess those skills is extremely limited. Today,
boards look for broad managerial ability, deep
experience at the CEO level, and demonstrated
mastery of management, finance, and other
disciplines.
In addition, U.S. corporations have in-
creased in size dramatically over the past
decade, thus increasing the responsibilities of
CEOs.CEOsat the largest companiesnowhan-
dle revenues that run into the hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars and manage tens of thousands
of employees. A 2007 Conference Board report
confirms that compensation for CEOs rises
with company revenue, as does the portion of
pay placed at risk.19 CEOs of the 10 largest U.S.
corporations collectivelymanagemore than $2
trillion a year in revenues, an amount equal to
15 percent of U.S. gross domestic product.
Newly hired CEOs are paid much more
than internally promoted CEOs, another fact
that undermines themythofmanagerial pow-
er. According to The Corporate Library, an
independent corporate governance research
group, the average total compensation of out-
side-appointed CEOs in 2005 was 2.6 times
more than inside-appointed CEOs.20 The
analysis is based on a study of the compensa-
tionof52CEOs in theS&P500: 32were inside
appointments and 20 were not.
In addition, the increasingly global and
competitive business environment pushes
boards to hire outsiders with broad skills,
rather than just firm-specific skills. In an
important 2007 study, Kevin Murphy and
Ján Zábojník document the shift toward hir-
ing outside CEOs who have broad manageri-
al ability.21 The broader skill set needed by
top corporate executives today commands
higher pay in the marketplace.
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Murphy and Zábojník report that during
the 1970s and 1980s, outside hires accounted
for 15 percent and 17 percent of all CEO
replacements, respectively. By 2005, 40percent
of all CEOs were hired from outside of com-
panies.22 Boards have also raised their require-
ments for these outside hires. The percentage
of outside hires with prior experience as CEO
at a publicly traded company rose from less
than 20 percent in the 1970s to nearly 50 per-
cent in the 1990s. Further, boards increasingly
demand that new CEOs have an MBA. In the
1970s 13.8 percent of all newhires heldMBAs,
which compares with 28.7 percent in the
1990s.
Murphy andZábojník find that thebodyof
knowledge that must be mastered by an effec-
tive CEO has exploded. For example, CEOs
increasingly must be able to communicate
with external constituencies, including the
capital markets, stock analysts, large institu-
tional shareholders, and themedia. In contrast
to claims that executive pay is rising because
the market is broken, Murphy and Zábojník
conclude that higher pay is “evidence that the
market for CEOs is becomingmore important
in determining CEOpay levels.”23
Another mark of a robust labor market is
the substantial variation in pay for executives
across companies,which reflects differences in
demand and growth opportunities. Executive
compensation reflects the different skills
required in various industries and the degree
to which CEOs can affect a company’s perfor-
mance. Companies in regulated industries, for
example, generally pay less than companies in
unregulated industries, in part because of the
more limited growth opportunities.24
Executive Pay Tracks
Corporate Performance
Executive pay has risen dramatically over
the past 10 to 15 years, faster than inflation
and faster than average employee pay.
However, pay has generally not risen faster
than the broad stock market and individual
company share prices. Indeed, there is a tight
relationship between executive compensa-
tion and corporate financial performance, as
we explore here.
To understand whether executive pay
tracks corporate performance, we need to
distinguish between “pay opportunity” and
“realizable pay.” The key differences are as
follows:
• PayOpportunity.This is what a board’s
compensation committee actually con-
trols and sets, namely annual bonus
opportunities and the fair or economic
value of new long-term incentive awards,
including stock options, time-vested
restricted stock, and performance shares.
• Realizable Pay. This is the actual cash
bonus paid, the in-the-money value of
stock options, the real value of restricted
stock, plus the payout fromperformance
plans.Realizablepay is determinedby the
actual financial performance of compa-
nies and stock price appreciation. Com-
pensation committees do not directly set
realizable pay, in large part because com-
mittees do not know what stock price
appreciationwill occur when they set pay
opportunity.
The key to accurately evaluating executive
pay is to look at realizable pay compared with
corporate performance over a specific period.
Our research demonstrates that realizable
pay closely tracks corporate performance. If
both company financial performance and
stock price appreciation are weak, then real-
izable pay will be low. If company perfor-
mance and stock appreciation are strong,
then realizable pay will be high. By contrast,
we find no correlation between pay opportu-
nity and company performance because pay
opportunity is competitively set and relatively
independent of recent performance.
The Data on Pay and Performance
Table 3 examines data on 1,072 major cor-
porations in theS&PSuper1500between2004
and 2006. The data are broken out between
companies generating high total returns to
7
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shareholders and those generating low returns.
The two right-hand columns show that CEOs
in high-earning companies earned far more
realizable pay than CEOs at companies with
low earnings. They earned 75 percent more
realizable total direct compensation (TDC),
which is annual cash compensation—base
salary plus actual annual incentive earned—
plus the economic value of long-term incentive
awards on the date of grant. And these CEOs
earned three times as much in realizable long-
term incentives (LTI), which comprise the in-
the-money value of stock options, period-end
value of restricted stock, and payouts from
long-term performance plans.
These higher returns for high-performing
executives are not “baked in the cake” when
executive pay packages are originally offered.
The proof is that the correlation between
company performance and LTI opportunity is
very weak, as shown in Table 4. Thus, execu-
tive skill at producing high returns for share-
holders is what generally determines the
actual compensation that CEOs receive.
Table 5 further illustrates the alignment
of pay and performance. Executives at low-
performing firms earned a much smaller
share of their LTI opportunity and TDC
opportunity than did CEOs at high-perform-
ing companies. These results show the sensi-
tivity between actual pay and performance
among today’s executives—CEOs who do not
achieve strong performance do not earn their
full pay opportunity.
8
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Table 3
Realizable Pay for CEOs and Company Performance
Companies Executive Compensation
Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative
Number of Returns (%), Realizable Realizable
Companies 2004–2006 LTI, $millions TDC, $millions
Companies Creating High Returns 536 99 5.2 10.5
Companies Creating Low Returns 536 17 1.7 6.0
All Companies 1,072 49 3.3 7.9
Source: Watson Wyatt Worldwide data.
Notes: LTI is long-term incentives; TCD is total direct compensation; returns refer to total shareholder returns (stock
price appreciation plus dividends). All numbers and percentages are medians, except for the number of companies.
Table 4
Pay Opportunity for CEOs and Company Performance
Companies Executive Compensation
Cumulative Cumulative LTI Cumulative TDC
Number of Returns (%), Opportunity, Opportunity,
Companies 2004–2006 $millions $millions
Companies Creating High Returns 536 99 4.8 9.9
Companies Creating Low Returns 536 17 4.3 8.4
All Companies 1,072 49 4.6 9.2
Source: Watson Wyatt Worldwide data.
Notes: LTI is long-term incentives; TCD is total direct compensation; returns refer to total shareholder returns (stock
price appreciation plus dividends). All numbers and percentages are medians, except for the number of companies.
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A common myth is that CEO pay only
increases over time, regardless of company
performance, creating ever-higher compensa-
tion levels. Our data show that while execu-
tive pay often increases, it sometimes decreas-
es. As noted earlier, realizable TDC depends
on company performance. Not surprisingly,
Table 6 shows a decrease (3 percent) in realiz-
able TDC for low-performing companies and
an increase (13 percent) for high-performing
companies in the period examined.
CEOsalso experience increases anddecreas-
es in annual paid cash bonuses. Table 7 shows
thatpaid annual incentives fluctuate fromyear
to year depending on company performance.
CEOs at low-performing companies saw a 23
percent decline in their paid annual incentives
for the year shown, while CEOs of high-per-
forming companies enjoyed a 22 percent
increase.
Factors in Setting Pay
Skeptics of the efficiency of executive pay
practices argue thatmanagerial power creates
upward bias in all forms of CEO compensa-
tion. They claim that directors approve exces-
sive pay packages to curry favor with CEOs in
exchange for high fees, reappointment, and
special perquisites. That claim overlooks the
market-based process that boards use to set
9
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Table 5
Company Performance and Full Pay Opportunity
Companies Executive Compensation
Ratio of Ratio of
Cumulative Cumulative
Cumulative Realizable LTI to Realizable TDC to
Number of Returns (%), Cumulative LTI Cumulative TDC
Companies 2004–2006 Opportunity (%) Opportunity (%)
Companies Creating High Returns 536 99 122 109
Companies Creating Low Returns 536 17 45 79
All Companies 1,072 49 77 96
Source: Watson Wyatt Worldwide data.
Notes: LTI is long-term incentives; TCD is total direct compensation; returns refer to total shareholder returns (stock
price appreciation plus dividends). All numbers and percentages are medians, except for the number of companies.
Table 6
Change in Cumulative Realizable Pay between Three-Year Periods
Companies Cumulative Realizable Pay (TDC)
Cumulative Change in
Number of Returns (%), 2003–2005, 2004–2006, Median
Companies 2004–2006 $millions $millions (%)
Companies Creating High Returns 379 94 9.8 11.1 13.1
Companies Creating Low Returns 379 17 6.9 6.6 -3.4
All Companies 758 48 8.6 8.7 1.8
Source: Watson Wyatt Worldwide data.
Notes: TDC is total direct compensation; returns refer to total shareholder returns (stock price appreciation plus divi-
dends). All numbers and percentages are medians, except for the number of companies.
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executive pay opportunity, beginning with
peer group benchmarking.
Virtually all boards use peer group bench-
marking to gain knowledge of the pay levels
offered by competitors. An important 2007
study of pay-setting practices found that com-
petitive benchmarking is used to gauge the
marketwages ofCEOsand to efficiently adjust
pay as necessary to retain executive talent.25
The managerial power explanation is also
undermined by the fact that boards have
becomemore, not less, independent over time.
This increased independence coincides with a
rise inexecutive compensationandthe increase
in CEOs hired fromoutside companies, which
is contrary to the idea that rising pay is evi-
denceofpowerful incumbents controlling cap-
tive boards.
The Securities and Exchange Commission
requires companies thatusepeergroupdata for
making benchmark comparisons of executive
pay todisclose thenamesof thepeer companies
in their proxy statement. Also, compensation
committees aggressively seek out objective
informationtohelpthemwiththedifficult task
of settingCEOpay.Compensation committees
must continuouslybalance twogoals: retaining
and motivating their executive team andmini-
mizing company costs. Committees struggle to
ensure that they do not waste corporate assets
in the formof excessive pay.
Creating the right CEO pay package at the
time of hiring, and at annual reviews, takes an
intensive effort on the part of compensation
committees. It requires data, expertise, and
judgment. In addition to peer group data,
compensation committees consider company
performance and possible changes to compa-
ny strategies, which may entail acquisitions,
new product lines, and other changes. They
conduct risk assessments of the voluntary
departure of their CEO and the costs of
replacing their CEO. In sum, compensation
committees must balance many factors to
motivate and retain executives while aligning
their objectives with those of shareholders.
Some critics ofU.S. executive pay point out
that top executives in other countries are gen-
erally paid less than their U.S. counterparts.
The international pay gap arises, they claim,
because foreign CEOs do not have the same
power over their boards. However, an impor-
tant study by Randall Thomas of Vanderbilt
University LawSchool documents the real rea-
sons behind the pay differential.26 The study
finds that U.S. CEOs are paid more, on aver-
age, than foreign CEOs because they con-
tribute more to their firms’ value. American
CEOs typically play a much larger role in the
decisionmaking processes of their firms than
CEOs at foreign firms. In addition, American
firms have greater growth opportunities and
10
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Table 7
Change in Actual Paid Annual Incentives for Executives, 2005–2006
Companies Executive Compensation
Actual Actual
Paid Annual Paid Annual Change
One-year Incentive Incentive in
Number of Change in in 2005, in 2006, Median
Companies Returns (%) $thousands $thousands (%)
Companies Creating High Returns 544 28 746 907 22
Companies Creating Low Returns 544 -3 647 500 -23
All Companies 1,088 12 670 728 9
Source: Watson Wyatt Worldwide data.
Notes: Returns refer to total shareholder returns (stock price appreciation plus dividends).All numbers and percentages
are medians, except for the number of companies.
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more resources to be deployed because they
are often larger. Furthermore, AmericanCEOs
receive more of their pay in the form of stock
options, andmay holdmore of their wealth in
company stock than foreign CEOs, thus their
higher pay also reflects a risk premium.
“Fixing” theMarket
for Executives
The issue of CEO compensation has often
become political fodder, which has prompted
federal policymakers to enact new laws and reg-
ulations tocontrolvariouselementsofexecutive
pay. In the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill
Clinton promised to “end the practice of allow-
ing companies to takeunlimited taxdeductions
for excessive executive pay.”27 More recently,
both major candidates in the 2008 presidential
electionhave lashedout atwhat theyperceive to
be excessive pay for executives.28 History teaches
us, however, that federal “reforms” andnew reg-
ulations distort markets and will likely have
unintended consequences.
Direct regulation of executive pay occurs
through the actions of the Securities and Ex-
changeCommission, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, and the Internal Revenue
Service. In addition, Congress occasionally
passes legislation that attempts to control exec-
utive compensation practices.
One example of the unintended conse-
quences of new federal rules arose from the
recessionof the early 1990s. At the time, critics
argued that inefficient executive pay policies
were hurting America’s ability to compete in
the international marketplace. That concern
led to legislation passed in 1993 creating
Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code,
which eliminated corporate taxdeductions for
executive pay in excess of $1 million that was
not deemed to be performance-based pay. But
rather than limiting executive pay as intended,
Section 162(m) led to dramatic increases in
the use of performance-based compensation,
particularly stock options, which subsequent-
ly came under attack as a source of excessive
compensation.
Concerns about excessive executive pay
during the 1990–1991 recession also touched
off new disclosure efforts. In 1992, the SEC
issued rules that required greater executive
compensation disclosure. As with most
reform efforts, however, this too had an unin-
tended consequence. With enhanced disclo-
sure, executive pay levels were transparent to
all, which worked to the benefit of those exec-
utives whowere undercompensated relative to
the norm. Those executives then demanded
higher compensation.
In the mid- to late 1990s, criticisms of
executive pay and efforts to reform it dimin-
ished as the economy flourished and share-
holders reaped large returns. Throughout the
1990s, the stock market continued its climb
virtually unabated. When the bubble popped
in the 2001 recession, it was clear that the
excessive use of options by some companies
had led to a short-term focus and, at a few
companies, illegal behavior. After the Enron
scandal broke in the fall of 2001, a rush of
external pressures pushed open the door for
radical changes in the laws and regulations
related to executive pay, including most
notably the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, signed into
law in 2002.
One of the more important parts of
Sarbanes-Oxley for executive compensation is
the prohibition on executive loans. Because of
this prohibition, boards now need to be more
creative in how they induce executives to join
their companies, often leading to more costly
alternatives such as restricted stock awards,
up-front signing bonuses, and enhanced sev-
erance. Ironically, these are all nowcriticized as
“pay for nonperformance” and as evidence of
inefficient executive pay structures.
AlthoughU.S. executive compensationwas
already themost transparent in the world, the
SEC issued new executive compensation dis-
closure requirements in early 2006. However,
as often happens, the market reacted more
quickly than regulatory bodies did, and had
already implemented improved disclosure.
The new disclosure rules may serve to reduce
the outliers, but for most companies the new
rules simply mandated what had already
11
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become a best practice in executive compensa-
tion.
The Financial Accounting Standards
Board also rode the momentum of the post-
Enron era and put in place mandatory stock-
option expensing under FAS 123R, effective
for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 2005.
This change has also produced unintended
effects. One effect is that many companies
have reduced the number of employees who
canparticipate in equity programs. In the late
1990s, the trend among employers was to
grantmore stock options tomore employees,
but with the expensing requirements of FAS
123R, those plans have been scaled back.
This unintended effect of FAS 123R is dis-
turbing because it reduces performance-en-
hancing incentives for nonexecutive employ-
ees, which minimizes the alignment of
incentives throughout organizations. If any-
thing, we should strive tomake the paymod-
el for all employees more like the executive
pay-for-performance model, not less.
The impact of FAS 123R is borne out by
both the magnitude of stock-option grants
and their value. Table 8 shows that total grant
size, as measured by the run rate (defined as
stock options awarded as a percentage of a
company’s common shares outstanding),
declined by almost a third from 2004 to 2006.
Also, the estimated value of options granted
has declined from $52 billion in 2004 to $40
billion in 2006.
In the post-Enron environment, the IRS
also saw an opportunity to further regulate
executive compensation. IRS scrutiny of non-
qualified deferred compensation plans ulti-
mately ledCongress topass legislationcreating
Section 409A of the tax code. The new rules
created significant restrictions on deferred
compensation programs. As a result of Section
409A, and the reduced income tax rates of
recent years, the prevalence of deferred com-
pensation is likely to decline. That is unfortu-
nate because deferred compensation denomi-
nated in company stock is an effective way to
promote long-termshareholderalignmentand
share ownership.
Executive Pay Practices Self-Regulate over
Time
All these new rules as well as other federal
interventions are misguided because various
external and competitive pressures already
work effectively to reform executive pay prac-
tices over time. Increasingly aggressive share-
holder scrutiny, especially from institutional
investors, has created substantial pressure on
executive pay practices. For example, large
institutional investors, and the organizations
that advise them, generate detailed corporate
governance reform recommendations. These
groups wield substantial power, and corpo-
rate boards are highly sensitive to their rec-
ommendations.
The largest mutual funds also monitor
and evaluate executive pay practices; and
union-sponsored funds are another forceful
voice. Other organizations have also stepped
up their efforts to monitor and influence
executive compensation policies, including
the Council of Institutional Investors and
Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.
In response to suggestions from these
12
Competitive
pressures already
work effectively to
reform executive
pay practices
over time.
Table 8
Company Stock-Option Grants after FAS 123R
Percentage Change
2004 2005 2006 2004–2006 2005–2006
Grant Size (run rate) 1.6% 1.4% 1.1% -31% -21%
Total Estimated Grants, $billions $52 $43 $40 -23% -7%
Source: Watson Wyatt Worldwide data based on companies in the S&P Super 1500. The data for 2004 is prior to the
rule change.
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groups, and to keep upwith the growing body
of knowledge about best practices in compen-
sation, boards are increasing the portion of
performance-based pay in overall pay, reduc-
ing severance, and reducing perquisites and
executive pensions. Some companies, for
example, are reducing cash severance pay-
ments or moving from single triggers to dou-
ble triggers on equity-vesting acceleration.29
Other companies are eliminating or modify-
ing change-in-control gross-ups, which com-
pensate executives for excise taxes imposed on
severance packages. Boards are also reducing
executive benefits and perquisites that have
been particularly criticized. From 2005 to
2006, the median total value of benefits and
perquisites for Fortune 100 CEOs declined
slightly.30 In 2006, 16 percent of Fortune 100
companies reported that they were eliminat-
ing someperquisites for executives.All of these
recent reforms reflect the fact that the execu-
tive labormarket and thepay levels it produces
self-regulate over time.
Conclusion
Many types of evidence indicate that the
market-based and competitive executive pay
model in the United States is very effective.
But the private sector should continue to
refine best practices to sustain this effective-
ness, while identifying specific shortcomings
that companies should address on a volun-
tary basis. At the vast majority of companies,
boards work hard to determine the right mix
of executive incentives in order to achieve
maximum performance for shareholders.
The managerial power theory—that execu-
tives are not compensated in an open and
competitive manner—has contributed to
meaningful and ongoing discussions about
corporate governance. However, when that
theory is taken too far, it leads to fundamen-
tal misunderstandings about executives, their
pay levels, and their role in building successful
corporations. These misunderstandings
sometimes lead policymakers to impose dam-
aging regulations on the labormarket and on
a pay model that is critical to vigorous busi-
ness expansion and American economic
growth. Occasional excesses in executive pay
can be dealt with without regulating the over-
all market and abandoning the core model of
pay-for-performance.
Whether corporate success is measured in
stock price performance, productivity, or
employment, it starts at the top of the corpo-
rate structure. The U.S. corporate model that
has generated so much wealth for American
citizens will be seriously damaged if we take
away or severely restrict the system of risks
and rewards that attracts talented executives
and pays them tomake the right decisions on
a sustained basis.
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